THE SKEPTICAL INVESTORTM

Issue No. 2. Mid-July 1997

Posted 22.VIII.1999

Nothing has happened in the past month to change the argument I put forward in the first Issue of The Skeptical Investor. This can be briefly summarised as two points. First, in conformity with what most investors now believe, the USA is indeed experiencing strong economic growth without any resurgence of inflation. But, secondly, stock markets there have nevertheless become severely overvalued and consequently a tumble is now a certainty.

Reiterating these two points is important because, if they are right, then those analysts who are attempting to predict the end of the current bull run in US stock markets by looking for a resurgence of inflation or other signs of looming domestic economic problems are probably barking up the wrong tree. It is likely to be a stock market crash that puts an end to our present apparently idyllic economic picture, not the reverse. Accordingly, it is to the stock markets themselves that we must turn for clues about what might happen (whilst of course maintaining a wary weather eye on the economy in case an unexpected storm brews up) and that is what I shall attempt to do in this Issue, as well as report on the, not unrelated, situation in the Asian Pacific Rim.

The US stock market bull continues.

The price you will have to pay to purchase an average Dow Jones or S and P stock has been too high for a long time now. This is based upon perfectly easy to use valuation methods--there is nothing very sophisticated or difficult about them. The trick to successful value investing is finding companies whose stock is undervalued by the market. Forget the "new era" thinking that says that because these valuation methods indicate that almost all stocks are nowovervalued by the market, but are still rising in price, the methods themselves must have ceased to be valid. This is at best nothing but psychological rationalisation, at worst a lie by cunning brokers talking up prices.

So, if we accept this contention that the stock market has ceased to represent and is ignoring economic reality, then common sense tells us that economic facts and analysis can not now give us very much in the way of information about how stocks are going to perform. The market now "stands alone", having become a self-referenced system, feeding on itself, and its performance to date--not external factors--is at present the best (indeed the only) predictor of future performance. That is why the increase in prices in these situations tends to become exponential: it is just mathematics, not economics. The more prices go up, the more money will be drawn in, and the more prices rise. (As an aside, it may be worth mentioning here that this is the reason for the oft observed fact that in bull markets, bad news is ignored--the process is not really being driven by economic news, except that good news reinforces the real underlying driving forces.)

And, because of this, there is no telling how far the market will rise or how long this bull will continue. There is an ultimate mathematical limit to it, the drying up of available new demand, but the pool that can be drawn upon (cash assets within the USA, such as bonds, and the ongoing flow of overseas funds into the American economy) is so huge that that the limit is a long way off indeed. Dow 12,000+ would likely be easily reached if the pool of new demand were the only limiting factor, and it is indeed considerations as this which are leading some analysts to predict that most stocks will continue to soar. And they may. But a sell-off may happen at any time. I will look at this below, but first want to consider what this analysis, if correct, means for equity investors.

Point 1: For most stock market investors, it is already too late.
If a lot of investors attempt to sell, the market crashes. That is all there is too it now. Some number of investors can take the courageous decision to sell out now, risking forgoing further profit, but holding their gains. Others might protect themselves by the use of derivatives,perhaps placing a down bet on a market index such as the S and P. The rest are in big trouble.

Point 2: Buying now for the long-term is foolish.
Given the risk of a crash, buy-and-hold is now the worst strategy an investor can follow. He is knowingly purchasing assets at very inflated prices. He is not only hoping that they will become even more inflated, but that they will stay that way.

Point 3: There are still opportunities for the skilled short-term and medium-term investor.
I have heard people say that a market like this one must eventually collapse "under its own weight", but this is merely rhetoric. It is not a meaningful statement, and has the unfortunate consequence of leaving an impression that the higher the market goes, the more probable it is to collapse in the near future. This is probably not true. Think of it like tossing a coin and getting seven heads in a row. Intuitively it is easy to feel that the likelihood of getting another head on the eighth toss is very low, but of course it is still exactly 50%. I consider that the probability of a crash in 1997 is no greater than it was in 1996. And, if we survive 1997, it will be no greater in 1998. But this does not mean go for a buy-and-hold strategy: that is rather like doubling up your bet on every toss --you must lose eventually. It does however imply that, provided you understand the risks involved, have a strategy appropriate to the times and a firm exit strategy, there may still be no more risk involved in short- and medium-term investing than there ever is. How does the probability that the market will rise as oppose to fall over the next month (two months, three months, ... ) look? It is more likely to go up than fall, but it is the size of the downside risk that is the problem; in my opinion this outweighs the probable gains of a medium-term investment in, say, no-load equity mutual funds. But, for those with the market savvy, there are strategies that can be used to make money if the market continues up, whilst limiting the downside risk. Going long through the purchase of call options (whilst keeping ones capital safe, and liquid) may be one of the best strategies, but it is only for those who understand options trading. Overall though, those in the best position to make money in this market probably are the short-term traders.

Point 4: Forget about sector rotating. This bull market now has little to do with the economic cycle. Business sectors in and out of favour are today a result of investors chasing momentum. And a market crash is going to take all sectors with it (precious metals mining stocks may just possibly be an exception).

Point 5: Be especially wary of Mutual Funds. Mutual Funds can perform very badly indeed in a severe market downturn. Fund managers are forced to sell stocks which they would prefer to keep,in order to meet cash redemptions. Many mutual fund investors are inexperienced and make inappropriate decisions. And, I'm afraid, many of the managers of these funds are themselves inexperienced kids who have been successful only because they happened to get into the business at an opportune time and have ridden the bull market on its way up. I certainly do not trust any of my money to a 30-year-old. Especially one who has never experienced a bear market, never mind an honest-to-goodness market crash.

What will end the bull?

The bull market will end when a sufficient number of investors realise the danger they are facing and sell out or short the market.

That is, there will be a failure of market sentiment. There are a myriad of possible things that could trigger this. It may be something big and obvious--a war that breaks out in the mid-east, a major financial or political scandal that erupts in America, a revelation that the Japanese have started selling off part of their huge holdings of US Treasury Bills. But more likely it will be something that on the surface looks trivial, or even no single trigger may be apparent: it may be simply an accumulation of tiny doubts adding up to a sudden panic. There is an analogy in the way a defeated army sometimes collapses, seemingly all at once, without any single event: military men will understand such a collapse of morale.

And, there will almost certainly be no warning. The technical analysts will probably not see it on their charts before it is upon them. If the trigger this time is some external event, then some fundamental analyst may have seen this event coming but there are so many scenarios out there, who knows which if any will be right until after it happens? And if it is just a failure of sentiment, then seeking a prime cause, even post hoc, will be a futile exercise.

How will it end? In the 1987 US crash, the market fell about 20%, then recovered within a few months. During the first months of 1990, the Japanese stock market, as measured by the Nikkei-Dow Index, fell more than 60% from its peak of 39,000.Today, almost seven years after, it stands at approximately 20,000. The Stock Exchange of Thailand Index topped out at 1754 on 4th January 1994, and has been steadily falling in a protracted grinding bear ever since. On 19th June this year it was 465, and has now recovered a little to 600 or so, but largely as a result of a recent de facto 20% currency devaluation. In the greatest stock market failure of modern times Wall Street, which began its slide in October 1929, had lost 90% of its value by the time the bottom was reached in 1932. Taking into account currency depreciation, the market did not fully recover until the late 1950s. And, in reality, it never really recovered because many of the companies represented on the market indices in 1929 failed and went into liquidation.

In the summer of 1929, a market correction was widely anticipated in the US, but it was almost universally believed that, because the economy was fundamentally healthy, it would be weathered and investors who held on and did not sell would be safe. Commentaries today are eerily reminiscent with more and more of the "talking heads" blithely predicting a 10% or 20% "healthy correction" possibly like that of 1987: a tacit admission by the way that the prices of stocks are too high. They were not so absurdly overvalued in 1987.

Using historical norms in terms of price/earnings ratios and yields, fair value would put the Dow Jones Industrial Average at perhaps 4,000-5,000. Thus, in the absence of massive intervention by the US authorities, historical precedent suggests an initial rapid fall of say 20% followed by a protracted bear market taking average valuations down to about 50% of their current levels. By that time negative momentum, investor fear, and the severe negative effects of such a massive disappearance of wealth from the economy will take prices much lower: I think that 2500 on the Dow is ultimately possible. Some analysts are predicting worse. But , from the point of view of an investor planning strategy now, the actual level to which the markets fall in a major crash doesn't matter very much: whether I anticipate 50% or 90% does not affect what I am doing today with my funds.

In order to make preparations for coping financially, it is not necessary to try to anticipate when there will be a market collapse, nor how far down the prices of stocks will go, but what is likely to happen financially and economically in the aftermath. And the key to this will be what governments and monetary authorities do. In 1987, the US Federal authorities were able to prevent the problem in the market from worsening and perhaps spreading into the whole economy by, in the jargon, "injecting liquidity" into a market which was in danger of simply seizing up. There are also persistent rumours that there was more direct intervention through, perhaps, large scale purchases of options. It is obvious that they will attempt to do the same this time, and presumably there is a very detailed contingency plan drawn up. However, they may fail because the sheer size of the problem is now so much bigger than it was then, and in that eventuality all efforts will be directed towards heading off the possibility of a severe, probably world-wide, recession. In Issue Number 3, I will explore the possible course of events in more detail.

Asia Watch

Meanwhile, apparently ignored by those North American investors blithely pouring money into stocks, the economies of much of the Asia Pacific Rim are unravelling.

Japan, already suffering from a protracted economic downturn, is now facing more problems. It has a huge exposure to Thai foreign debt; in fact it has more investment committed to Thailand than to any other foreign country. And Thailand may have trouble repaying its debt.

It is estimated that (because much of it is denominated in yen, US dollars and other foreign currencies) the recent de facto devaluation of the Thai baht has increased Thailand's total foreign debt by 9% to 17%. Eighty percent is owed by the private sector, so some significant proportion of this is likely to be repudiated through corporate failures. The fact that Thailand has been in communication with the International Monetary Fund, Japan, Taiwan, even the People's Republic of China, for help, indicates the scale of the problem.

As for the domestic effects in Thailand itself, the country is facing a severe, and probably protracted, slump. The currency devaluation itself is inflationary (because imported goods and raw materials now cost more), but I believe that a nasty deflationary recession is more likely to develop. Repudiation of debt--one of the immediate causes of deflation--appears to be spreading. Even Bernard Trink in his nightlife column in the Bangkok Post has been commenting on the number of people walking away from condominium mortgages, and cars being repossessed. When I was in Bangkok myself for a conference late last year, I was shown a brand new hotel which (just before Christmas, at the height of the tourist season) only had ten percent room occupancy: the property boom of recent years is going to end with many business failures. Several finance companies and banks are facing difficulties due to bad loans, mainly on unsalable offices, hotels and condominiums. The government has been attempting to alleviate this problem with low interest loans, forced mergers with healthy companies, and so on. They have even forced some, including one of the largest, Finance 1 PLC, to suspend operations in June for a month, hoping to find ways to solve the crisis. (What will happen to the bonds issued by Finance 1?). But I expect that it will get away from them, and, unless there is a massive international bail-out, the country will slide into an economic depression.

Another Asian Tiger, South Korea, is facing similar problems. Stock markets have declined to long-term lows, and the currency is under pressure. Bad debts are described as "snowballing": trading in corporate bonds has virtually ceased. This week, the country's 8th-largest conglomerate, Kia Group, became insolvent, and there are rumours that as many as ten other financial conglomerates may be near bankruptcy. The Bank of Korea is said to be "injecting liquidity" to stave off further financial failures, and other measures are being taken. (I have no faith in the ability of such government measures to do more than provide temporary relief: the debts are real and always show up somewhere else in the economy.)

In Singapore too, stock markets have been falling--the Straits Times Index is off 23% from the high reached on February 26th, 1996--and the currency is weak. Malaysia and the Philippines are also experiencing troubles.

What is causing these problems? These are all countries that have apparently been doing very well economically: even the laggard Philippines has bee playing catch up with its regional neighbours. There is no international economic slump to destroy their export markets, no major war, no big natural disaster. Well, there are both economic and financial factors involved, and both are at least partly caused by the growing asset bubble in America.

All the countries, other than Japan, referred to above have two things in common other than being in South East Asia. They have, or until recently had, currencies linked to the US dollar, and they are very dependent upon exports. Consequently, as the black hole of US financial asset markets has drawn in money from everywhere, driving up the dollar, the strengthening of these countries' dollar-linked currencies has reduced their export competitiveness (without being matched as in the US by massive capital inflows). This is the economic effect.

Probably more damaging though are the financial effects. These fast-growing economies need huge amounts of foreign capital to finance that growth. Some of this is money earned from exports, but much of it comes from foreign investment, and it does not take an actual reversal of these capital flows into the economy--a slowing will do--for the whole financial structure to start falling apart. It becomes apparent that much of the economy is little better than a Ponzi scheme--perhaps that is a little harsh, but growth is certainly dependent upon ever increasing inflows of credit to keep it going. Without this it goes into reverse. Quite simply put, the US financial markets are sucking in much of the available capital now, resulting in liquidity crises in these countries. This by the way is not just money that is going into American stocks; it is money being drawn into all US dollar denominated assets.

Putting this into the form of a concrete example. One can stand on one of the footbridges over the Sukhumvit Road in Bangkok and watch the day-long traffic jam beneath. There will be many shiny new Toyotas for instance. Purchased with a baht loan. The baht profit becomes yen in Tokyo. And is invested, or frees up money to invest, in US dollar assets in America. Feeding the asset bubble there, and drawing money out of the Thai economy and the Japanese economy. A rather simplistic example for sure, but that is the sort of route that capital is now following.



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