THE SKEPTICAL INVESTORTM

Issue No. 10 May 1998: SPECIAL EURO ISSUE

Posted 6.V.1998

CONTENTS

The world is sticking so close to the script that it is frightening. Japan is in a deflationary contraction and sliding further downhill towards a Depression. The Asian markets that crashed last year bounced up and are now falling back towards their previous lows - looking like perfect textbook "Suckers' Rallies" to me. And the United States Bubble is expanding just as have all previous historical financial bubbles, in denial, greed and unreason, towards its inevitable but not necessarily imminent collapse. This has all been covered before in The Skeptical Investor, and commenting further this month would be redundant.

Instead, I am taking the opportunity to devote this month's Issue to something that, compared with the above, is a side issue but is going to become increasingly important to the international investor: European monetary union and the euro. The euro may become an international reserve currency to rival the US dollar . . . or it may collapse in chaos.Something to keep a close watch on. It is too early to come to any conclusions, but here are my considered thoughts.

Does size matter?

Over the weekend, the heads of government of the European Union met to rubber-stamp formal approval of the eleven nations joining the first wave of European Monetary Union, and to agree to the first, and as it turned out also the second, head of the new European Central Bank.

Unless there is some unexpected disaster, the new European currency unit,the EURO(currency code = EUR), will be introduced on schedule on January 1st 1999(although the introduction of Euro coins and banknotes will not occur until later).

As a European by birth, and knowing that the success of monetary union will inevitably result in a federal "United States of Europe", I have to admit that I hope that it will be a total and resounding failure. Like, I suspect, most people there, I do not want the proud ancient nation states of the continent to be absorbed into the bureaucrat-ridden Tower of Babel that is the EU. But, as aninvestor I have to ignore such feelings and unemotionally attempt to assess what will happen. Hard currencies like the D-mark and the Austrian schilling - there are not many around - will disappear. Will the euro offer me a replacement hard currency for my portfolio? Will the euro become a significant international reserve currency (the implications are enormous)? Will it even be introduced successfully? Or survive?

The initial "euro area" will include eleven countries. They are Germany,France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,Finland, Ireland and Austria. With 291 million people, 19% of the world's GDP and 18% of the world's trade, this economic unit will easily rival the USA (268 million, 20%, 17%) in size and will push Japan far into third place(126 million, 12%, 10%). When the remaining four members of the EU (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Greece) join in a few years time the de facto "United States of Europe" will be the biggest economy ever.

Those are facts. But to take those same facts and then conclude from them that, as I keep reading "With the euro, the dollar will have serious competition as the world's leading reserve currency" is a logical non sequitur. It may, but the size of the euro area economy is not the factor that will determine that. Size alone does not matter much: compare the performance of the Swiss Franc with the US dollar during the 1970s and 1980s.

Will the euro survive?

The obvious answer is "probably, yes". But European monetary union is an unprecedented experiment. I do not think there has ever before been a case where monetary union has preceded political union. So Europe is sailing in uncharted waters. Waters full of dangerous reefs.

The period from now to the formal introduction of the euro on January 1st 1999 might be interesting. There is great potential for speculative attacks on member currencies if the, essentially artificial and political,pre-announced exchange rates of any member currency become at odds with market value. The collapse of one or more of the member currencies will have big implications, but is unlikely by itself to stop the introduction of the euro on schedule. There will be a political "fix".

But the period from the actual introduction of the new currency on January 1st to the total phasing out of the member currencies (scheduled for 2002)is the period of maximum danger. The member currencies will be fixed at irrevocable exchange rates with the euro, and hence with each other. Now where have we heard that before? I seem to remember that, only one year ago in fact, there were a group of countries whose currencies had fixed exchange rates with the US dollar (hence with each other) - Thailand was one wasn't it, and a few others in Asia ... ? As was the case in Asia last year, Europe is a region of strong but different economies growing at different rates. They are at different stages of development - compare the low income countries of the south such as Portugal with the high income north such as Austria - and different stages of the business cycle.With a system of floating exchange rates, the currencies move in response to the differences. But once they are artificially fixed, stresses can build up very quickly. Opportunities for speculative attacks on currencies will be there, and the apparent belief of European politicians- despite very recent lessons to the contrary - that they can ignore market forces and fix exchange rates for several years by diktat boggles the mind. But the big danger is that businesses and investors also assume that this can be done, and thus that exchange rate risk between these currencies has been eliminated. Businesses who do not continue to hedge their intra-European exchange rate risks during this period might wake up one day facing the same sort of problem as many Asian companies are facing now. Investors should take these risks into consideration.

Will the euro be a hard currency?

The euro was intended to be a "hard" currency -stable and credible. Like the German D-mark has been. At first this looked very possible. Today it looks increasingly unlikely.

The strength of the Euro will be largely dependent upon three things:-

(1) The size and strength of the underlying economy,

(2) The remit and independence of the European Central Bank, and

(3) The gold and foreign exchange reserves held by the ECB.

The size and strength of the euro-area economy

Size does have some significance. The argument is that the more transactions that are done in euros,the lower average transactions costs should become. The lower the costs,the more incentive to use the euro in business transactions, and to hold it as a portfolio component. Also bonds denominated in euros have increasingly greater liquidity, leading to lower costs and lower yields. Good for corporations and governments. These things are all true, but are of small importance compared with many other factors and the size of the euro area alone will have little to do with the strength of the currency.

The strength of the underlying economy will be far more important, and that is somewhat problematic. The economy of the initial "euro area" has some real weaknesses which will chip away at the credibility of the euro and weaken it. Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty convergence rules there were several strict fiscal criteria that every country had to meet to be admitted.These were designed to ensure the credibility and strength of the new currency. By early 1997 it was clear that few countries could possibly meet them (other than the United Kingdom, which wasn't joining the first wave anyway!). There was some talk of a launch with just a core group of countries but it was apparent that not even the two key countries would qualify without bending the rules - France fell short of the 3% public borrowing to GDP requirement and Germany did not achieve the 60% total public debt to GDP criterion. To get a 1999 launch would mean abandoning the Maastricht treaty conditions for France and Germany, so obviously it was politically impossible to exclude any other country that was able also to "cook the books" (use accounting fictions) to at least be able to pretend it met the agreed criteria. The launch should have been delayed, but it was decided to "cook the books"instead. (A very powerful indication of a future "soft' euro subject to political whim and legerdemain). Considering that there isn't a nation on earth whose public accounts would not constitute criminal fraud if offered up by a corporation in the USA, Canada, or Europe, "cooking the books" has not required all that much creativity. In the end, of the countries who wanted to join the first wave, only poor old Greece ended up"undercooked" and was excluded.

Of the eleven "euro" nations only three (France, Luxembourg and Finland) meet the important 60% public debt to GDP requirement! The Maastricht Treaty has been 'interpreted' as only requiring that progress is being made towards the 60% ceiling!

All eleven countries achieved the 3% public borrowing to GDP ceiling.But France did it by using a one-off transfer from the France Telecom pension fund to squeak through. Italy did it by adding an estimate to their GDP to account for the underground economy - 20%! (Actually, provided that the figure is reasonably correct, that is fine - the "underground economy" is true wealth creating free enterprise.) Other countries changed their corporate accounting rules in order to dishonestly massage their GDP upwards, for example by restricting businesses' right to charge losses against current income. The list goes on.

Certainly, public spending was reduced substantially in order to reduce the public borrowing side of the required ratios. But what is to stop any country allowing their spending to soar again now that they are "in".Especially as the rest of the euro countries will be picking up the tab. There is no mechanism to expel them - merely some rules that permit withholding of EU funds and, in extreme cases, the ability to levy fines. Here, once again,what began as sound rules have been undermined. At the Dublin Summit in 1996, in the words of a Financial Times editorial "the meeting was dominated by a titanic clash between the French and the Germans over the terms of the Stability Pact for enforcing budgetary discipline in the future euro zone, if necessary through draconian sanctions. Kohl and Chirac, their faces almost touching, tore into each other. After 17 hours of negotiations, the Stability Pact was renamed the Stability and Growth Pact to take account of French demands that more attention should be paid to job creation." We all know what that means - more socialistic tax and spend. Given this watering down of the public spending rules and the fact that the entry requirements have been mostly thrown out of the window, the credibility of the measures has become virtually zero.

The remit and independence of the European Central Bank.

The European Central Bank was intended to be a model of monetary probity,like the German Bundesbank has been, with its primary objective being price stability (i.e. fighting inflation):-

"In accordance with Article 105(1) of this Treaty, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the object of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a of this Treaty."

It was to be free from political interference:-

"In accordance with Article 107 of this Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks."

And to help both to ensure this independence and also stability of policy and strategy, the bank's key people are to be appointed for a term of eight years and they cannot be removed except under exceptional circumstances:-

"In accordance with Article 109a(2)(b) of this Treaty, the President, the Vice-President and the other Members of the Executive Board shall be appointed from among persons of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of the Heads of State or of government, on a recommendation from the Council after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council.Their term of office shall be 8 years and shall not be renewable.Only nationals of Member States may be members of the Executive Board."


[EXTERNAL LINK] Full text of Maastricht Treaty.


A sound set of rules and principles. But in the very first action, the appointment of the first head of the ECB, the politicians made a very confidence damaging breach of the intent and spirit of the Treaty. Wim Duisenberg has been appointed as head but had to "voluntarily" agree to resign after only four years, when a French national Jean-Claude Trichet will takeover (apparently for a full eight year term). "This is not a fudge" said Tony Blair! What it is is what any Court of Law would know as a legal fiction.

There is an interesting twist to this sordid event. In his xenophobic determination to get a Frenchman appointed over the objection of every other member of the EU (all of whom found Duisenberg acceptable) the socialist President Chirac got a man, Trichet, who is known as being much stricter on monetary discipline than Wim Duisenberg. Which is likely why the market showed little reaction to what happened. But a very bad precedent for the independence of the ECB has been established, and we will have to wait a long time now to see just how well this institution will be willing or able to protect the value of the new currency.

The gold and foreign exchange reserves held by the ECB.

We do not yet know much about this. With the most important "hard"currency - the D-Mark - disappearing, the Japanese Yen being very weak,and gold being unfashionable there is not much left but the USD.

As the whole point of holding foreign currency reserves is that you can sell them if necessary to defend the home currency, too much reliance on the USD doesn't make sense. Look at the situation in which Japan now finds itself. Japan holds enormous USD reserves and is attempting to shore up a falling Yen. But because of the situation in the USA, Japan cannot sell to many dollars without weakening the dollar and driving up US domestic interest rates. Totally counterproductive. So the reality is that Japanese USD reserves do not function effectively to back the Yen. It would work in a small nation whose total dollar reserves are not so significant, but the euro needs huge reserves behind it - like the Yen does.

Presumably, the euro will be backed by some Swiss Francs, Sterling (at least at first), Yen and a few other currencies in addition to dollars.But the only answer that I can see that will offer any real strength and stability is to hold significant gold bullion reserves. By significant I mean 20%-30%. [This argument by the way is one of the reasons that I recently changed my call on gold over at my Precious Metals Website to 'cautiously bullish'.]

There was supposed to be an announcement about the makeup of euro reserves at last weekend's summit but it did not happen. So we will have to wait and see. This is a very big issue for the credibility of the new currency.

Will the euro rival the dollar as an international reserve currency?

If it survives the transition period, and is proven a stable currency its use as a major reserve currency may accelerate rapidly (especially in view of the problems I have outlined above with the dollar). But the transition period is fraught with such dangers that I do not see this process starting quickly.


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